image I’d also like to mention, while I’m irritated about the blogosphere’s short memory, the renewed attention that happened today regarding the Iranian Deep Packet Inspection issue.

It’s clear to most of us that the Iranian methods of censorship are not sophisticated. We all covered this last week when several very in depth articles on the topic came out (including several by me).

Somehow, when the Wall Street Journal says Nokia-Seimens is selling censorship technology to Iran, everyone believes it without researching or even remembering what they wrote three days earlier.

Infuriating, I tell you. Particularly when Slashdot draws attention to it, when that crowd should be particularly savvy to the fact that this isn’t what’s going on.

I wrote a comment there which got absolutely no traction, yet obviously should have:

Not surprisingly, the Wall Street Journal has this completely wrong.

The DPI software/hardware does *not* do the broadband filtration that the WSJ says it does. At SALabs, our R&D arm of the SiliconANGLE blog, we’ve done some pretty extensive research, and it’s plain to us (and likely most of the IT audience here at Slashdot) that the type of censorship taking place in Iran is unsophisticated and isn’t the result of DPI techniques.

We have several articles going into this matter on the site.
(http://www.siliconangle.com/ver2/?p=5972) (http://www.siliconangle.com/ver2/?p=5925) and (http://www.siliconangle.com/ver2/?p=5919).

The bottom line is that this stuff is good old fashioned gateway blocking of addresses. The DPI software that Nokia sells is for mobile network packet shaping only, and not useful for censoring an entire country’s information infrastructure.

Is everyone set straight now, though? 

Good.